Remi Guillet Cet article a été écrit par Rémi GUILLET aujourd’hui retraité.

Ingénieur de l’Ecole Centrale Nantes (ex ENSM promotion 1966) il est aussi Docteur en Mécanique et Energétique (Université H. Poincaré-Nancy 1-2002) et diplômé en Economie/Gestion (DEA Université Paris 13-2001).

Son activitĂ© professionnelle l’a amenĂ© Ă  travailler essentiellement en recherche appliquĂ©e dans le domaine de la combustion. Il s’est fait notamment connaĂ®tre pour ses travaux sur la « combustion humide », recevant un Prix « Montgolfier » des Arts chimiques en 2002 (Prix dĂ©cernĂ© par la SociĂ©tĂ© d’Encouragement de l’Industrie Nationale). Il a Ă©tĂ© en charge du secteur Energie/BTP au siège de OSEO entre 1995 et 1998…

Remi Guillet proposes a model for corporate management which, while continuing to offer the challenge of profit, would lead shareholders to take a different view of the level of wages paid out by the company and also give its wage earners a different view of the company’s profits. In other words, the relationship between shareholders and wage earners would change from one of defiance to one of confidence and conflictual interests would become cooperative.

The model is essentially based on a new way of calculating rewards to shareholders. In the same way as the rewards of labour are the sum of salaries and the level of employee participation in profits or dividends, the model proposes that, symmetrically, the remuneration of shareholders would be the sum of dividends and plus a fidelity bonus indexed to the wage bill.

By this approach, symmetry which is currently lacking would be reached between the interest of each group in the form of demands for more dividends on the one hand and a higher wage bill on the other. This change would provide new opportunities for negotiations between actors on both sides which would thus naturally move from a conflictual basis, particularly for the share of wages to a situation in which each party’s interests are visibly convergent, thus opening the door to cooperation and the benefits which flow from it.

This new system of remuneration also has other properties of interest to companies. The lowering of fixed wage related charges would allow greater flexibility in remuneration of wage earners and open up new perspectives for employment. It follows that shareholders would no longer be solely identified with capital and workers no longer identified only with labour. Remuneration for either party would be hybrid. The values attributed to growth indicators would be affected by this hybrid character to the extent that, if the model were applied in its ideal form, the growth in the mass of salary payments would become equal to the growth in rewards to shareholders, to growth in added value and to growth in productivity. The occasion would thus be provided for a new look at the way companies operate, for new socio-economic analyses and then appears the base of a new “government” for the company.

A long summary is available in english under the title “For a new distribution of risks and profits in the company or the presentation of a new model to regulate the companies” (l’Harmattan publisher)

The full text is available in french language under the title “Pour plus de solidarité entre le capital et le travail ou de nouvelles chances pour l’emploi » (l’Harmattan publisher - last version in 2009 -)